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Abstract: BB84 (Bennett and Brassard 1984) is one of the well known protocols of quantum keys 
distribution. It is built to allow two interlocutors commonly called Alice and Bob to share two similar 
binary keys and to detect the eavesdropper presence (the eavesdropper is commonly called Eve). 
However, Eve presence in a disturbed environment causes errors to the sifted keys and decreases the 
amount of secure information between Alice and Bob. One of the most important stages in BB84 
protocol is to decide by using error probability estimation if we can continue the protocol phases or no. 
Indeed, this decision is function of some factors like: what is the amount of information that we will 
lose in the error correction phase? What is the degree of errors detected in our sifted keys? What is the 
origin of these errors: Eve strategy or the channel disturbance? For these reasons, we will study in this 
study some conditions to stop BB84 protocol in the context of depolarizing channel. We implement 
two types of eavesdropping strategy: Intercept and Resend and Cloning Attack. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
  It’s known that the security of symmetric 
cryptography is mathematically proven
 [1]: Eve cannot 
have information about message transmitted by Alice to 
Bob if they use two common binary random keys at the 
same message length. To have unique keys for each 
message is impossible; this fact isn’t allowed by 
transmission supports and techniques. Quantum 
cryptography or Quantum Distribution keys (QKD) is a 
new field of cryptography specialized to resolve this 
problem of sharing keys between these two 
interlocutors
 [2]. Since 1984, more and more protocols 
are implemented beginning by BB84
 [1, 3] and arriving to 
SARG04 (Scarani-Acin-Ribordy-Gisin 2004)
 [4]. Note 
that BB84 and SARG04 are not different in quantum 
phase which is our study subject. It also approaches 
experimental results exposed in article
 [4] with multiple 
attacks. Moreover, it’s obvious that security research is 
oriented to experiments reality which can’t envisage 
future problems. Technology developments will permits 
to Eve more and more efficient procedures that can’t be 
realized actually. Having theory models is so necessary 
to estimate future problems of security. For example, 
we note that cloning attack can’t be experimentally 
implemented with our actual technology means but its 
optimality obliges the researchers to consider it in 
models as forecast to future Eve strategies
 [5, 6]. For 
these reasons, beginning with security notions our 
contribution consists of giving some criteria to stop or 
continue BB84 (or SARG04) protocol. We model errors 
origins like Eve presence and depolarizing channel - 
equivalent channel with Binary Symmetric channel in 
classical terms
 [7].  
  This study will be divided into four parts: the first 
relates to a necessary detailed description of our error 
sources models. The second and third parts will provide 
the stop conditions and criteria of the BB84 protocol 
after the quantum communication: we begin with 
Intercept and Resend spread in its use and finish with 
cloning attack which danger comes form its optimality. 
We will end carrying out comparative discussions 
between the various eavesdropping techniques and 
gives efficiency study by knowing depolarizing 
parameter.  
 
Error sources modelling: Protocol BB84 like any 
other protocol of quantum cryptography is based on two 
principal phases: a quantum phase via a one-way 
physical quantum channel and a public phase using an 
authenticated two-way classic ideal channel 
[8, 9]. We 
note that the channel notion changes according to study 
point of view 
[10]. Indeed, in this article we use the term 
“channel” without adjective for all imperfections which J. Computer Sci., 3 (6): 424-429, 2007 
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lead to the sifted keys - binary sequences obtained after 
public discussion compatibility of bases. Consequently, 
it includes the eavesdropping strategy used and the 
physical quantum channel (sources, detectors, optical 
fibers…). During our study, we chose as physical 
channel model the depolarizing one which is 
mathematically considered as unitary operator Tp 
[7] 
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Depolarizing channel leaves intact a qubit  ψ
 with 
probability (1-p) or applies one of the Pauli matrices σi 
(≠ identity matrix) with probability p/3 for each one; p 
is called the depolarizing parameter. 
  Another error source that we must consider is the 
eavesdropping presence. Indeed, considering the effects 
independence of the eavesdropper and the depolarizing 
channel, a state sent by Alice can follow one of the two 
transmission ways (Fig.1) with respective probabilities 
(1-q) and q. Considering only the depolarizing channel 
effect (without Eve presence), we show in other work 
that the error probability Pe is equal to 2p/3
 [11]. 
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Fig. 1:  Analysis model 
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Fig. 2:   Analysis model with intercept and resend 
eavesdropping (Alice-Bob) 
 
Stop conditions (Intercept and resend 
eavesdropping case): Intercept and Resend is the most 
known eavesdropping strategy that can be implemented 
with actual technology means
 [5]. In the explanation 
terms: Eve replaces Bob by applying random bases 
measurements to some qubits and each result will be 
sent to Bob without any change. After Alice and Bob 
public discussion about their bases measurements 
choices (to eliminate incompatible ones), Eve, by 
observing the two interlocutors decision to build sifted 
keys via the authenticated public channel, construct her 
one by leaving bits that correspond to Alice and Bob 
incompatibility measurements. We define for this 
eavesdropping strategy the probability s that one qubit 
sent by Alice to Bob is eavesdropped. If we consider 
only Eve effect, we can prove that the error probability 
is equal to s/4
 [12]. Thus, our analysis model (Fig.1) can 
be transformed with another form (Fig.2). By 
computing conditional probabilities (equations 2 and 3) 
between Alice and Bob, we show that they are 
independent of q and that error probability is given by 
equation 4. 
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  Immediately, average mutual information between 
Alice and Bob is obtained by using this equation: 
IAB=p(0/0)log2(2p(0/0)) + p(1/0)log2 (2p(1/0))      (5) 
  Moreover for computing average mutual 
information between Alice and Eve we use an analogue 
model to that given in Fig.2 (Fig.3). 
Conditional probabilities between Alice and Eve are 
with q = ½: 
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Note: q is not valid for s = 0.  
  Thus, average mutual information between Alice 
and Eve is computed: 
IAB= p(0/0)log2(2p(0/0)) + p(1/0)log2 (2p(1/0))   for s≠0                       
IAB= 0 for s = 0                                                       (8) 
  An important parameter to study security of a 
quantum cryptography protocol is secure information 
(or secret information) given by this equation
 [5]:  
) 9 ( AE AB s I I I − =  
  Like error probability, this parameter can be 
plotted as function of depolarizing parameter p and 
eavesdropping probability s. We can define a threshold 
of secure information ε below that BB84 protocol must 
be stopped. But, the only parameter that can be easily 
reached by the two interlocutors is error probability. 
Alice and Bob can choose random bits which are 
compared by public discussion and thus permit to have J. Computer Sci., 3 (6): 424-429, 2007 
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an error rate (an estimation of error probability). It 
should be noted that bits used to estimate this 
probability must be eliminated in order to avoid the 
increase of Alice-Eve average mutual information
[1, 2]. 
We represent in (Fig.4) secure information as function 
of error probability for different p and s values. 
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Fig. 3:   Analysis model with intercept and resend 
eavesdropping (Alice-Bob) 
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7
-0.2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
Error probability
S
e
c
u
r
e
 
i
n
f
o
r
m
a
t
i
o
n
p increases from 0 to 1 p increases from 0 to 1
s increases
from 0 to 1
 
Fig.4:  Secure information as function of error 
probability (for Intercept and Resend 
eavesdropping)  
  If the two interlocutors choose a decision threshold 
of secure information ε below that they stop protocol, 
they choose in other terms a decision threshold of error 
probability Pemax - a limit of error probability tolerated 
between Alice and Bob. Note that if we haven’t an 
estimation of our channel p-value we can work with p = 
0. For this condition, some thresholds are presented in 
Table. 1 
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Fig.5:  Secure Information as function of depolarizing 
parameter for different s-values (for Intercept 
and Resend eavesdropping) 
 
Table  1: Threshold decision of error probability as function of 
threshold decision of secure information (for Intercept and 
Resend eavesdropping) 
ε             1           0.7064          0.5020         0.1594             0 
Pemax          0             0.05              0.1                0.2               0.25 
 
  In order to have an efficient protocol ε must be 
between two values: a min value εmin and a max value 
εmax. If we choose ε out of this stroke, the protocol will 
be automatically stopped (efficiency problem). These 
limit-values are function of depolarizing parameter 
(Fig.5). As you see, we can consider that εmax as secure 
information for s = 0 and εmin as secure information for 
s = 1. It should be noted that εmin ≥ 0; for this reason 
εmin = 0  p (Table.2). 
 
Table  2:  Secure information stroke as function of depolarizing 
parameter (for Intercept and Resend eavesdropping) 
P                0              0.2               0.5           075            1 
εmin                   0               0                   0              0              0  
εmax            1            0.4335          0.0817        0          0.0817 
 
Stop conditions (cloning attack case): Cloning attack 
eavesdropping is an optimal attack. Indeed, Optimality 
comes owing to the fact that we obtain the minimum of 
secure information with this strategy compared to the 
others. In the explanation terms: Eve uses a unitary 
operator U called cloning transform. This operator can 
approach the cloning act which is impossible in 
quantum theory (non-cloning theorem) 
[5]: J. Computer Sci., 3 (6): 424-429, 2007 
 
  427
( )
( ) () ()
E A AE
yE yA yE yA yE yA
yE yA yE yA
AE AE
H H H and force attack
U
U
H H U
⊗ =  

 
 ∈
+ =
=
→
:
2
, 0
1 0 sin 0 1 cos 0 1
0 0 0 0
:
π
θ
θ θ
   (10) 
1-2p/3 
2p/3 
1-2p/3 
(1-cosθ)/2 
(1+cosθ)/2 
1-2p/3
2p/3
1-2p/3
Probability (1-q) 
Probability q 
(1+cosθ)/2 
(1+cosθ)/2 
(1+cosθ)/2 
(1-cosθ)/2 
 
Fig. 6:   Analysis model with cloning attack eaves 
dropping (Alice-Bob) 
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Fig. 7:   Analysis model with cloning attack eaves 
dropping (Alice-Bob) 
  
 The  symbols  HA and HE indicate respectively the 
spaces states of Alice and Eve. Moreover, note that this 
operator is defined in y-base (diagonal base). If 
ψ  is 
the ket sent by Alice, Eve apply the unitary operator U 
and send only the qubit concerned by Alice
 [12]. She 
stores her qubit and decides to measure it after public 
discussion between the tow interlocutors about their 
compatibility bases. So, if we consider only Eve effect, 
we can prove that the error probability is equal to 
 (1-cosθ)/2. Thus, our analysis model (Fig.1) can be 
transformed with another form (Fig.6). 
  By computing conditional probabilities (equations 
11 and 12) between Alice and Bob, we show that they 
are independent of q and that error probability is given 
by equation 13. 
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Fig.8 Secure information as function of error 
probability (for Intercept and Resend eaves dropping) 
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Fig. 9:  Secure Information as function of depolarizing 
parameter for different θ-values (for cloning 
attack eaves dropping) 
 
 Immediately,  Information between Alice and Bob 
is obtained by using equation 5. Moreover for J. Computer Sci., 3 (6): 424-429, 2007 
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computing Information between Alice and Eve we use 
an analogue model to that given in Fig.2 (Fig.7). 
Conditional probabilities between Alice and Eve are 
with q = ½: 
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Note: q is not valid for s = 0.  
  
  Thus, information between Alice and Eve is 
computed also by using equation 8. In addition to that, 
we determine the secure information immediately. This 
parameter can be plotted as function of depolarizing 
parameter p and attack force θ. We can define also a 
threshold of secure information (and obviously of error 
probability)  ε below that BB84 protocol must be 
stopped. We represent in Fig.7 secure information as 
function of error probability for different p and θ 
values. It also could be noted that if we haven’t an 
estimation of our channel p-value we can work with p = 
0. For this condition, some thresholds are presented in 
Table. 3 
 
Table.3: Threshold decision of error probability as function of 
threshold decision of secure information (for Cloning attack 
eavesdropping) 
ε                1      0.5859         0.4598     0.1758            0 
Pemax               0      0.0480         0.0711     0.1135         0.1464 
 
  Similarly and for protocol efficiency, ε must be 
between two values: εmin and εmax (Fig.9). 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
  The choice of decision threshold is so crucial to 
continue or stop the BB84 protocol. This choice must 
be below a maximum value- function of depolarizing 
parameter: 
max 2 2
24 2 4
l o g( ) ( 1 ) l o g( 2 )
33 3 3
p pp p
ε =+ − −
   (16) 
  Note that this equation is independent of 
eavesdropping technique. Indeed, some remarks must 
be given: 
*  If we don’t know the p-value, the choice of ε must 
be uniform between 0 and 1. The probability 
p(ε≤εmax) = εmax can define the protocol efficiency. 
This efficiency is function of p; it decreases by 
increasing p (for p ≤ 0.75).  
*  If we know a max value of p (for example p1 ≤ 
0.75) we can compute immediately εmax(p1) and 
effectively we can increase efficiency to the 
maximum by choosing ε uniformly between 0 and 
εmax(p1). Indeed, we obtain p(ε≤εmax) =1.  
*  If we know exactly the p-value for the depolarizing 
channel, by choosing ε uniformly between 0 and 
max() p ε the efficiency is 100%. In addition to that, 
this information (knowing p-value) increases the 
possibility of having more secret after error 
correction
 [13].  
 
Note: The efficiency notion discussed in this part 
concerns only the efficiency of our choice of decision 
threshold.  
  Moreover, we can prove that upper and lower 
bound given in article
 [14] for BB84 protocol with one-
way communication corresponds to our model: 
depolarizing channel + attack cloning (by varying p). It 
also approaches experimental results exposed in article
 
[15] with multiple attacks.  
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